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Abstract
This article considers changes to the regional composition of New 
Zealand’s annual refugee resettlement quota under the fifth National 
government. The method is based on an analysis of material collected 
across four years of Official Information Act requests and further 
research conducted in the course of the Doing Our Bit campaign 
to double New Zealand’s refugee resettlement quota. The article 
outlines changes to the regional composition, the stated rationale 
behind them, and the effect of these changes. It concludes with an 
argument that these changes be reversed by the new Labour-led 
government. 
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Official Information Act. I have analysed 
this approach in Stephens (2014), which 
gives some insights into changes in the 
refugee quota under the fifth National 
government. The present article forms 
the most in-depth analysis of the regional 
changes yet. It adds to already published 
Twitter threads, press releases, interviews 
and editorials discussing these policies. 
Whereas previous discussion had aimed at 
highlighting concerns with the policy in 
an attempt to embarrass the government 
into a change, the current article takes a 
different approach. Here I seek to bolster 
the arguments against the policy which 
have already been made by a range of 
government departments.
What is the refugee quota and why is it 
important? 
The refugee quota is an annual intake 
of refugees, the number and regional 
make-up of which is decided by New 
Zealand, which then works with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) to fill those places. 
The people who become quota refugees 
are assessed, interviewed and ultimately 
selected in their first country of protection. 
For example, Syrian refugees from our 
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In this article I consider changes to the regional composition of New Zealand’s annual refugee resettlement quota 
under the fifth National government. The 
article draws from research conducted in 
the course of the successful Doing Our 
Bit campaign to double New Zealand’s 
refugee resettlement quota. I outline these 
changes, the stated rationale behind them 
and the effect of the changes, and provide 
an argument for them to be reversed. 
Approach
I draw primary material from a range 
of Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (MBIE), Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and Office of Ethnic 
Affairs documents released under the 
which regions does New Zealand  
take refugees from and why?
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most recent intakes have been assessed in 
Lebanon, their first county of protection, 
before being flown to New Zealand as part 
of our annual quota. 
The refugee quota is one of three main 
ways that a refugee can gain protection in 
New Zealand, alongside making a successful 
claim for asylum, which requires them to 
be in New Zealand, or being welcomed as 
part of a family reunification programme. 
Internationally, the vast majority of 
refugees who gain a new residency receive 
protection as asylum seekers: this was the 
case for the refugees who sought protection 
in Europe during the peak of the refugee 
crisis of 2015. Whereas asylum seekers are 
assessed, and either accepted or rejected, 
once they’re in the country from which 
they seek protection, quota refugees have 
already gone through that process before 
they arrive. To think of it another way: 
some people use the term onshore to 
describe asylum seekers, as they are granted 
protection only once they have already 
arrived; offshore is used to describe quota 
refugees and those coming under the 
family reunification programme, as they 
are recognised as refugees before arriving.
The refugee quota is important as it 
provides a vehicle for the most vulnerable, 
as selected by the UNHCR, to receive 
protection. While asylum is more often 
claimed by those with the skills, resources 
or will to get to a country that may accept 
them, the refugee quota protects those who 
are least likely to survive prolonged 
displacement and who have the least 
prospects for either voluntary repatriation 
or local integration (UNHCR, 2017a). The 
quota tends to be used most by countries 
that are a long way from conflict zones 
where large numbers of refugees originate 
(UNHCR, 2017b). Resettlement through 
the refugee quota is particularly strong in 
North America and Australasia, with some 
nascent programmes in Europe.
We might think of the quota as the way 
for countries who don’t receive a large 
number of refugees applying for asylum to 
do their bit for refugee protection. In that 
sense, while the quota is technically a limit 
on the number of people who can come, it 
places no limit on the number of asylum 
seeker places. A better way of thinking of 
the quota is as an artificial minimum – like 
a minimum wage – which ensures that a 
certain number of people gain protection. 
The Doing Our Bit campaign was 
occasionally confronted with people who 
wanted to abolish the refugee quota, 
thinking this was the equivalent of opening 
our borders to all people seeking protection. 
By way of comparison, that would be like 
hoping the abolition of a minimum wage 
would lead to higher wages.
What is New Zealand’s regional refugee ban 
and what is its effect?
In 2009 the incoming National-led 
government worked with MBIE’s 
predecessor, the Department of Labour, 
to streamline the assessment of refugees 
in Immigration New Zealand offshore 
interviews. This led a year later to a three-
year planning and implementation stage 
for selecting who would arrive under the 
refugee quota. In the first analysis of what 
that three-year quota would look like the 
new government sought to refocus New 
Zealand’s refugee quota on the Asia–Pacific 
region.1 The initial proposal suggested 
moving the entirety of New Zealand’s 
refugee intake to this region as a response 
to ‘regional pressures’.2
Three core reasons emerged for this 
refocus. The first reason was cost: it was 
both cheaper to fly people in from South 
East Asia, where the majority of these 
people would arrive from, and to focus just 
on this area would allow economies of scale 
in the process where New Zealand 
immigration officials interview potential 
quota refugees referred to us by the 
UNHCR. The second reason expands on 
the notion of regional pressures: specifically, 
the aim was to stem the number of people 
who might attempt to make the dangerous 
journey by boat to Australia from Indonesia. 
By resettling people from South East Asia, 
the government hoped that this would 
create hope that the refugee quota system 
might be the best avenue for registered 
refugees to find protection in a resettlement 
country like New Zealand.
The final reason behind a restructure 
was described as ‘broad security concerns’. 
I will give attention here to this reason as 
it is the one that focuses on the 
characteristics of those not from the Asia–
Pacific rather than the characteristics of 
those who are. One might also be inclined 
to devote more attention to this reason 
because it is the most sensitive of the three, 
as indicated by the persistent redaction of 
discussion of it in OIA responses. Similarly, 
scholars have devoted considerable 
attention to the ‘securitisation’ of forced 
migration, which focuses on the threat of 
refugees to the country accepting them, 
rather than on the risk to refugees (for 
example, see Hammerstadt, 2014 for a 
critical reading). Those risks are twofold: 
those posed by the circumstances of forced 
migration, such as the original war and 
persecution, and then the dangers 
associated with displacement, such as 
smuggling, disappearances and the lure of 
dangerous journeys to claim asylum.
From the texts available, it appears 
‘broad security concerns’ are threefold. First, 
there may be a ‘risk to New Zealand’s 
international reputation’. This concern 
focuses on the potential for New Zealand 
to accept refugees whom we may one day 
find were not eligible to be refugees. This 
concern also speaks to a broad description 
of people who may pose a risk to New 
Zealand. The second concern is over 
Legal advice suggested ... that only taking 
refugees from the Asia–Pacific region may 
result in a breach of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights, as it may restrict the ability of 
already resettled refugees to use the quota 
as one avenue for family reunification. 
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credibility issues with the statements and 
claims made by prospective refugees. The 
final concern is based on the difficulties 
potential refugees might have resettling in 
New Zealand, which one document 
describes as ‘insurmountable’. Of the three, 
the final two are elaborated upon in the 
documents – with no specific mention of 
African and Middle Eastern refugees. 
Almost all of the elaboration on security 
concerns has been redacted, which, despite 
some persistence, was not overturned in a 
lengthy appeals process with the 
ombudsman.
Legal advice suggested, however, that 
only taking refugees from the Asia–Pacific 
region may result in a breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights, as it may restrict the 
ability of already resettled refugees to use 
the quota as one avenue for family 
reunification. An alternative to the 100% 
Asia–Pacific intake was suggested, agreed to 
and put into practice: 50% of quota refugees 
were to come from the Asia–Pacific, 15% 
from the Middle East, 17% from Africa and 
18% from the Americas.3 This alternative, it 
was argued, would also help assuage ‘likely 
concerns’ from the UNHCR, which, it was 
noted, has a global objective to focus 
resettlement on those refugees in the greatest 
need, ‘the majority of which are in Africa 
and the Middle East’. Prior to the Asia–
Pacific focus, the regional intake was split at 
around 30% each for Africa, the Middle East 
and the Asia–Pacific.4
The family link criterion as restriction
If the new regional quotas were the extent 
of the rearrangement of New Zealand’s 
refugee quota they might escape scrutiny. 
However, a proviso was also placed on 
refugees from the Middle East and Africa 
that they would only be accepted if they 
already had family in New Zealand. This 
proviso was not extended to refugees 
from the Americas, so we might deduce 
that what became known as the ‘family link 
criterion’ is less a function of cost or helping 
with pressures in the Asia–Pacific and 
more about the broad security concerns 
identified earlier. A rosier interpretation 
might be that as it was only in 2007 that the 
Americas was introduced as a resettlement 
region, the exemption from the ‘family 
link criterion’ for the Americas might be 
intended to build a sustainable community 
among this recent intake.
Regardless of the reason for placing a 
family link criterion on refugees from Africa 
and the Middle East and not the Americas, 
the agreement on the composition of the 
refugee quota explicitly stated that the 
ministers of immigration and foreign affairs 
would decide on the new allocations. 
Without fail they redirected the percentage 
of refugees originally allocated to Africa and 
the Middle East to the Asia–Pacific region 
when insufficient family-linked places were 
found. Over the years, a lack of people 
qualifying for the family link criterion 
became the norm, with intakes from both 
Africa and the Middle East dwindling to 
single figures. This was not due to a lack of 
possible family to bring to New Zealand, but 
because these potential quota refugees 
needed to be outside their country of origin 
and registered with the UNHCR, which did 
not have the facilities or resources to 
specifically seek out these cases.
One way around these restrictions was 
found when 100 Syrian refugees were 
welcomed in 2014–16 in an emergency 
category from within the quota. This intake 
preceded the 600 extra places granted at 
the height of the refugee crisis. These 
Syrians bolstered the numbers coming 
from the Middle East; without it, the 
number of refugees from the Middle East 
would be almost as low as of those from 
Africa. 
So, while we have proposed intakes 
from the Middle East and Africa in the 
double digits, our actual intakes are much 
smaller. Consider the 2014/15 intake5 in 
Figure 1, which shows both the actual, in 
contrast to the proposed, intake.6
Thanks to the enthusiasm for blocking 
out large amounts of text in OIA releases, 
researchers are forced to speculate as to 
what the middle column in this table might 
represent. Given that the reason cited is to 
do with information having been entrusted 
to the government by an international 
organisation, and that the UNHCR in 
Canberra was the only group asked about 
our quota composition, it is fair to guess 
that the missing column is a recommended 
intake from them. From my dealings with 
the UNHCR in Canberra I would expect 
these recommendations to have a much 
more even split between regions.
While New Zealand has not explicitly 
banned refugees from the Middle East and 
Africa, the policies implemented by the 
National-led government have effectively 
led to that outcome for refugees from 
Figure 1: 2014/15 agreed and actual intake
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Africa, and to a significant decrease for 
Middle Eastern refugees, augmented by the 
emergency places for Syrians. If American 
president Donald Trump’s rejection of 
Middle Eastern and African refugees has 
been evidenced by a series of smoking gun 
tweets, New Zealand’s move away from the 
same regions is a purposeful, but difficult-
to-prove death by a thousand cuts.
Resistance to the ban from government 
departments and political opposition
This policy has not gone without comment 
from the relevant government departments. 
From 2013, MBIE has noted their inability 
to fill the African percentage of the 
quota and suggested that the minister of 
immigration approach Cabinet about 
removing the family link criterion so that 
the full percentage of the quota from 
Africa might be welcomed. Ignoring the 
advice from MBIE, as well as advice that 
the current situation means New Zealand 
will not meet its proposed regional goals, 
Cabinet has retained the family link criteria.
The only successful challenge to the 
restrictions was made in 2013 when the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
MBIE, contrary to earlier claims of 
pressure in the Asia–Pacific region, noted 
that they were likely to struggle to find 
enough refugees in the Asia–Pacific to fill 
a regional intake that had become more 
than two thirds of the quota. They 
successfully argued for allowing Afghan 
refugees who were living in Pakistan to be 
classified as part of the Asia–Pacific region. 
The Afghan refugees are predominantly 
from the Hazara group, a minority group 
in Afghanistan persecuted for their Shia 
faith. Hazara have had a long connection 
with New Zealand, with a large number 
of the Tampa refugees being Hazara. They 
also have connections forged with the 
New Zealand Defence Force’s provisional 
reconstruction team in Bamiyan, the 
heartland of the Hazara people.
During the 2016 triennial review of the 
refugee quota, the Office of Ethnic Affairs 
responded to a request for comment by 
noting that ‘some of our community 
stakeholders from former refugee 
backgrounds perceive the current family 
link criterion is unfair and discriminatory’. 
Despite these concerns, the family link 
criterion – the effective ban on new 
refugees from the Middle East and Africa, 
with a few small exceptions – was retained. 
Even though the minister was by now fully 
aware that the proposed percentages would 
not be met, no suggestion was made to 
remove the family link criterion or make 
the proposed percentage more reflective of 
the difficulty of filling these family-linked 
places. If the community concerns about 
the unfair and discriminatory aspect of the 
family link criterion were included in the 
final aide-memoire that went to Cabinet, 
they are in the redacted portion of the 
document.
At the 2017 election, the restrictions 
became the subject of parliamentary 
discussion when the Greens took a stand 
against the family link criterion, 
campaigning to remove it (Green Party of 
Aotearoa New Zealand, 2017). When James 
Shaw questioned the then prime minister, 
Bill English, about the criterion, English 
referred to the Syrian emergency intake as 
a way to suggest that the restrictions do not 
exist:
James Shaw: Can he confirm that his 
Government cut the number of 
refugees New Zealand takes from Africa 
and the Middle East when it is precisely 
those people who are in the most 
precarious and needy situation?
Rt Hon BILL ENGLISH: There will 
be a range of opinions about the 
relative need among refugees, but the 
Government did respond to the very 
large number of refugees from Syria by 
opting to take several hundred more of 
them over the next few years. (Hansard, 
2017)
This denial was indicative of what I 
speculate to be embarrassment felt by the 
government about the policy, as evidenced 
by their OIA redactions, obfuscation in the 
House of Representatives, and inflated 
proposals for regional intakes that they had 
repeatedly been told would not be met.
What is the problem with the ban?
There are four significant problems with the 
family link criterion that has banned new 
refugees from Africa and the Middle East 
from being settled in New Zealand, with 
the three exceptions of an emergency intake, 
family link or if they have been able to 
escape the region. These problems have all 
been touched on already, but I want to focus 
on each one in more depth. The problems 
are how the changes (1) undermine the 
UNHCR focus on the most vulnerable; 
(2) compromise the universalism of 
human rights that underwrites accepting 
refugees; (3) discriminate against existing 
communities; and (4) represent a de-
basement of the political process.
First, the ban on these new refugees 
undermines the UNHCR’s focus on using 
the scant resettlement places for those most 
at risk. While New Zealand has maintained 
a commitment to resettling women at risk, 
one of these core categories, it is clear that 
the greatest regional need has been in Africa 
and the Middle East, where conflicts – 
including but not limited to those is Syria, 
Iraq and South Sudan – have created 
substantial crises. While the recent escalation 
of displacement of Rohingya from Myanmar 
has created a new need for resettlement 
from the Asia–Pacific region, it would still 
be difficult to justify taking more than 50% 
There are four significant problems with 
the family link criterion that has banned 
new refugees from Africa and the Middle 
East from being settled in New Zealand, 
with the three exceptions of an emergency 
intake, family link or if they have been 
able to escape the region. 
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of our quota from this region. Similarly, the 
level of need in the Asia–Pacific has no 
relation to the policy of only taking family-
linked refugees from Africa and the Middle 
East, while accepting those from the 
Americas regardless of a family link.
The second problem with the ban is 
more philosophical, but is no less 
important. By placing caveats on who we 
will or won’t take based on generalised 
concerns about potential security risks, the 
universalism of human rights is 
undermined. If human rights only apply 
to people outside the regions where the 
greatest needs and challenges are, a state of 
exception is created that undermines the 
very basis of human rights.7 Persecuted 
groups are rarely made refugees in a one-
off act; first, their status as deserving of 
human rights is undermined and their very 
being debased.8 When New Zealand buys 
into this generalised debasement and 
penalises all potential refugees from both 
Africa and the Middle East under the rubric 
of security concerns, then we are buying 
into the process of persecution.
The third problem is that raised by the 
criticism made by the Office of Ethnic 
Affairs, and is an extension of that originally 
used as a justification against taking the 
full quota from the Asia–Pacific region: 
discrimination against potential refugees 
based on their region discriminates against 
existing resettled communities. The small 
size of New Zealand’s refugee quota has 
meant that resettled communities already 
struggle to maintain members in the face 
of larger communities in Australia and 
elsewhere abroad. The message from the 
government that these refugees are not 
seen as capable of resettlement success 
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy for those 
communities already resettled.
Finally, there is something 
fundamentally dishonest in the descriptions 
and reasons employed by the previous 
government in their restrictions of refugees 
from these two regions. Where Trump was 
very direct about banning people from 
certain countries from entering the United 
States, giving the rationale for it as religion, 
our government was not so clear. The 
tendency to describe this policy as 
providing ‘opportunities’ for family 
reunification might strike the uninitiated 
reader as positive. But these opportunities 
are merely the reuniting of families from 
previous intakes while slamming the door 
on any new resettlement from those 
regions. This kind of doublespeak does 
nothing to endear politicians or the 
democratic process to the general public, 
leading to cynicism and disengagement 
from the political process.  
Speaking of race, refugees and migration
Assumptions and stereotypes based on 
race and religion contribute to how people 
view New Zealand’s refugee resettlement 
programme. Opposition to refugees as a 
whole has not been coherently expressed 
in the mainstream media in New Zealand. 
Commentators who take positions 
opposed to the refugee quota tend to 
either focus on opposition to certain 
kinds of refugees and on their likelihood 
of integrating into New Zealand society, or 
erroneously assume that New Zealand’s 
refugee resettlement programme is the 
same as the asylum seeker movements 
across Europe that they have seen on 
the six o’clock news. See, for example, 
Cameron Slater on his blog Whale Oil, who 
says, ‘I have no problem with the concept 
of refugees, or even the doubling of a 
quota’ (Slater, 2016). Similarly, Karl Du 
Fresne focuses on Islamic asylum seekers, 
the inclination of liberals to welcome them, 
and the need to avoid giving asylum in case 
this leads to an ‘ugly Far Right’ resistance 
in New Zealand (Du Fresne, 2016).
Pro-refugee advocates tend to focus 
their attention on the latest conflict that 
has received media attention, from Syria 
through to the more recent focus on 
Rohingya refugees. While this focus on 
those most in danger is important, it also 
fuels a short-term focus on emergency 
intakes that struggles to lead to long-term 
or systemic solutions. This approach also 
rarely discusses systemic racism (or even 
mention race at all, except to denounce 
those like Slater and Du Fresne), accepting 
the premises by which particular refugee 
situations lead to media coverage, while 
others do not.
The kind of plain talking about race 
and refugees that would offer truly liberal 
outcomes – that is, outcomes not 
determined by race, religion or anything 
other than immediate need – is rare. Ann 
Beaglehole, in both Refuge New Zealand 
(2013) and in interviews, provides a 
striking example of acknowledging the role 
of race in refugee resettlement. In a 
discussion with myself and Wallace 
Chapman on RNZ’s Sunday Morning 
programme, she noted the ease of her own 
experience as a refugee arriving in New 
Zealand in the 1950s: ‘Hungarians on the 
whole had a very good reception because 
we were white and I had blue eyes’. Speaking 
of newer refugees, she notes, plainly ‘there 
would have been some prejudice against 
them because they didn’t have white skin’ 
(RNZ, 2016).
While contemporary mutations of 
racism may be more sophisticated than 
Commentators who take positions 
opposed to the refugee quota tend to 
either focus on opposition to certain kinds 
of refugees and on their likelihood of 
integrating into New Zealand society, or 
erroneously assume that New Zealand’s 
refugee resettlement programme is the 
same as the asylum seeker movements 
across Europe that they have seen on the 
six o’clock news. 
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overt talk of skin colour, this does not 
mean that racism has gone away. 
Commentators like Slater generalise 
terrorism to all 1.3 billion of the world’s 
Muslims; Du Fresne expresses specific 
concern about Muslims from North Africa 
and the Middle East. At the softer end of 
the spectrum, a spokesperson for New 
Zealand Customs explains why returning 
Syrian New Zealanders are being regularly 
submitted to extensive post-travel 
screening: ‘A range of indicators are 
considered when deciding to interact with 
passengers – from nationality (to determine 
if a passenger has originated travel in, or 
passed through, a region of risk), through 
to body language and general demeanour. 
Customs does not profile passengers based 
on religion or belief ’ (Vance, 2017). Where 
Slater and Du Fresne are clear and precise 
about who they are opposed to coming to 
New Zealand, New Zealand Customs and 
the National-led government have 
obscured the basis of the securitisation 
which has taken precedence over 
humanitarian concerns and universal 
human rights in their work. 
Conclusions and recommendation
While a surface reading of the official 
documents might not show the kind 
of profiling based on religion or belief 
that the world has come to expect in an 
age of Trump, which has rarely been the 
New Zealand way, a close reading of the 
multiple documents, across nine years 
of the previous government, shows that 
this government systematically used the 
logic and language of risk and security 
to minimise the number of African 
and Middle Eastern refugees accorded 
protection in New Zealand. It ignored the 
advice of its departments and turned the 
protection of refugees into a question of 
our security, with little consideration for 
theirs.
But this is not the whole story. Given 
the overwhelming opposition to the family 
link criterion in advice on the refugee 
quota from MBIE and other government 
departments, there is reason to hope the 
new government will reject the regional 
allocations and restrictions of its 
predecessors. Just as Nicky Hager 
concluded his Other People’s Wars (2011) 
with praise for the New Zealand Defence 
Force soldiers who confiscated a rifle from 
an Afghan farmer rather than simply 
shooting him, I am heartened by the 
commitment to the universalism of human 
rights underwriting their consistent advice 
to reject the family link criterion. I hope 
that, even prior to the 2019 refugee quota 
review, the new government will accept the 
advice of MBIE (or whatever new ministry 
it becomes) and remove the family link 
criterion. Doing so is the only way for our 
refugee quota to truly play our little part 
in meeting the world’s humanitarian needs.
1 While the quota is planned to cover a three-year block (e.g. 
July 2010–June 2013), it is also planned and implemented 
on a year by year basis, hence the annual quota is the block 
of time most commonly referred to.
2 As the documents referred to here are spread across many 
OIA responses, each consisting of multiple papers and 
working papers, I won’t reference specific papers. Instead 
I would point interested parties to two ways of seeing 
the original documents: first, all of the OIA responses 
have been collected at https://fyi.org.nz/user/m_stephens; 
second, a Twitter thread shows the original selections 
of documents here: https://twitter.com/DoingOurBitNZ/
status/825554122938081281.
3 Note that these regional allocations were not for the regions 
refugees originated from, but where they had applied for 
protection. For example, a Somalian making a claim in 
Malaysia would be considered under the Asia–Pacific quota.
4 The last ten years of refugee quota arrivals are recorded by 
Immigration New Zealand at https://www.immigration.govt.
nz/documents/statistics/rqbarrivalsstatpak.pdf. However, for 
a longer term view see the useful archive at http://www.
refugee.org.nz/stats.htm. 
5 Intakes run from 1 July–30 June, so overlap two calendar 
years.
6 I have left in the sections redacted from this OIA release to 
give some sense of the difficulty knowing the exact reasons 
for these restrictions on African and Middle Eastern refugees.
7 Giorgio Agamben has offered a rich critique of this 
circumvention of rights in his State of Exception (2005).
8 For an excellent contemporary documentation and analysis 
of this process see Steffen Krüger’s ‘Barbarous hordes, brutal 
elites’ (Kruger, 2017).
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